Missed opportunity

Optimists had thought that this time, the talks might actually meet with success. After all, the conditions needed to resolve the never-ending negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program have never been so favorable.

The regime in Tehran is under enormous pressure; the economy is on its knees. Years of increasingly tough sanctions have isolated the country on the international level, cut it off from financial transactions, strangled industrial production and reduced oil and gas exports to a minimum. Iranians, who themselves have struggled with runaway inflation and deteriorating living conditions, want only one thing: the end of sanctions and a return to some kind of normality.

With the moderate President Hassan Rouhani in charge, all parties have hoped for a thaw between Iran and the international community, and a solution to more than a decade of smoldering conflict. And Rouhani's political survival hinges on his success in improving his country's economic situation.

West hoping for success

On the other side are the interests of Western negotiators. US President Barack Obama needs a win in his foreign policy battles, and has been able to break through the impasse between Iran and the US that existed since the Iran hostage crisis in the early 1980s.

Obama is looking for a strong regional partner in the fight against "Islamic State" militants who have enslaved parts of Syria and Iraq and threaten to destabilize the entire region. European negotiators, meanwhile, are looking for proof that their foreign policy tactics, a mixture of persistent diplomacy and consistent sanctions, can in the end lead to success.

And now it looks as if this latest round of negotiations, which have been on and off for that last 12 years, will once again end in postponement. Last November, both sides signed a framework agreement which foresaw a solution within six months. The agreement failed, and in the summer it was extended by another yet another six months. And this latest deadline now looks as if it will have to be extended once more, well into next year. Anyone not blessed with the boundless patience of a professional diplomat has long since written off the negotiations as belonging to the Theatre of the Absurd.

An end in itself

This, in the end, is the disadvantage of a long, drawn-out approach to this difficult challenge. After countless meetings, talks have come to a deadlock. Every argument has been heard a thousand times, and both sides have become entrenched in their positions.

For Washington, success means a radical reduction in Iran's capacity to enrich uranium. The aim is to make it so that the country would need a year to potentially produce a nuclear bomb, the time the West needs to respond to such a threat.

For the regime in Tehran, success means just the opposite. Iran aims to keep as many mainstay centrifuges as possible, with which it could potentially produce weapons-grade uranium. The Revolutionary Guard and other Tehran hardliners have made Iran's membership in the world's exclusive club of nuclear powers a point of national honor, even while they continue to deny these intentions.

But over the past decade, Iran has progressively - and dramatically - built up its nuclear capabilities. The West, meanwhile, has made Tehran every possible offer to allow for the development of a peaceful nuclear energy program. The Iranian leadership, however, has required the lifting of sanctions as a quasi-prerequisite to any deal, and refuses to agree to any checks or a significant reduction of its nuclear potential.

Is a break needed?

Both sides have remained stuck in these positions for years. It's impossible to hide the fact that, as German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier pointed out, "we are still far apart on many issues," back then and still today.

Before this latest round of talks, some observers argued that the stakes are now too high on both sides. An eternal postponement of negotiations can no longer be seen as a positive sign. But as long as internal power struggles in Tehran continue to make any real progress all but impossible, it makes perhaps more sense to put talks on the back burner.

Of course, the West doesn't want to destabilize President Rouhani, but if he can't prevail at home it's useless to try to seek his cooperation on an international level. And there remains no basis of trust with Tehran, which could make any future political advances credible. For now, it seems we'll just have to continue waiting for Iran to tone down its hatred and ideology and return to the international community with an offer of more reasonable plans for cooperation.