Al Qaeda in Yemen

President Barack Obama has decided against sending troops to Yemen and is instead backing the Yemeni military with training, intelligence and equipment, but US determination and military hardware may not be enough to extract al Qaeda from Yemen.

Through his long rule over the vast expanse that makes up Yemen's territory with its unruly tribes, southern separatists and political opponents, President Ali Abdullah Saleh has developed three main pillars on which he bases his power; the tribes, the army and Salafi extremists.

Through political cunning and these alliances the president has managed what no other president has before him, to unite the north and the south of the country and to remain in power for 30 years. But what has served him in the past may now prove a problem.

"The alliance started early," says Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, a Yemen based political analyst. "And it has served him well."

Over time the cooperation has been profitable to all parties. Whilst the president has ruled the vast swaths of land outside the capital by proxy through the tribes, tribal leaders have been paid for their troubles. As long as the money flowed from Sanaa the tribes have stuck to government policies.

The president has also used Salafi extremists and the army to strengthen and consolidate his power. According to several analysts President Saleh has relied on them to dilute the strength of any perceived opposition. In turn the Salafis have been allowed not only to penetrate the security forces, but to spread their ideology across Yemen. They view the president as the founder of a single Yemeni state governed under the Sharia law (Islamic law).

In the deeply complicated intricacies that make up Yemeni politics al Qaeda has for some become a bargaining chip, whilst the terror network with others finds deeply rooted loyalties and ideological connections. Some critics say that al Qaeda is a product of the president's three pillars of power.

Analysts say that the president's support for the traditional tribes and the orthodox Salafi movement has stifled development and political reform in the country and radicalised the country.

"The alliance has suffocated moderate Islam and perpetrated a vicious cycle of decline that needs to be broken," says al-Iryani. As a result even with a strong partner in the US, Saleh may not be able to eradicate al Qaeda in Yemen. "His alliance between the tribes, the military and the Salafis now limits his options."

Radicalizing the country

With the president's blessing, Salafi extremists have been allowed to spread their influence largely unchecked across Yemen. "We have branches in most of the provinces," says Mohammed al-Mehdi, the leader of Yemen's Hikma [wisdom] Salafi organisation. Through construction of 700 to 800 mosques since unification in the 1990's Salafis have spread their ideology aided by the Religious Affairs Ministry widely across the country.

"We follow the regulations and instructions of the government, so we face no constraints," he says.

The organisation also provides social services to the impoverished population and, with it, religious indoctrination. "We have received a certificate as the top charity in Yemen," says al-Mehdi. "Our objective is to educate and invite people to Islam."

The US, al-Mehdi warns, should not interfere with the internal affairs of Yemen, a caveat echoed by much of the Salafi community. This not only makes US intervention difficult, but also makes it tricky for President Saleh to manoeuvre.

The cooperation between the Salafis and the president dates back to the 1980s when Yemen was the main exporter of mujahidin, second only to Saudi Arabia, in the fight against the Soviet invaders in Afghanistan. Tens of thousands of Yemenis went. On the battlefields volunteers learned about armed jihad and many returned radicalised.

Upon their return many former mujahedin were absorbed into the army and intelligence apparatus, especially the Political Security Organisation (PSO). "It was considered an expedient solution," says al-Iryani.

In 1994, four years after the unification of Yemen, the former mujahedin were utilised against the Marxist southern separatists in the civil war. "They brought Marx," said the president, "We bring them Muhammed."

Ten years later volunteers were again tacitly permitted to go on jihad to fight the American-led invasion in Iraq. According to insiders it was elements within the PSO that facilitated their travel documents.

Today it is generally acknowledged by high ranking officials in Sana'a that insiders helped in the escape of 23 convicts from a high security prison in Sanaa in 2006, some of whom were convicted for being behind the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000.

"You cannot expect that those who assisted the men going to Afghanistan would later imprison them for it - They [PSO] are ideologically driven, not politically," says one Yemeni analyst, who does not wish to be named.

Read more on al Qaeda's operations in Yemen

AQAP made in Yemen

It was a mixture of effective anti-terror efforts in Saudi Arabia and the prison break in 2006, which facilitated the creation of al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in January 2009, a fusion between operatives from the Saudi kingdom and Yemen under the leadership of Nasser al-Wahayshi and his deputy Saeed al-Shihri.

With a security apparatus penetrated by returned Mujahidin sympathetic to al Qaeda, the president has in the past had a tacit agreement with al Qaeda whereby both sides would leave each other alone. It is in this light the president's tolerance toward al Qaeda should be viewed after the USS Cole bombing in 2000 and later attacks on foreign interests in the country, say analysts.

However, AQAP is viewed by experts as the second generation of al Qaeda in Yemen. The network which is estimated to consist of a few hundred core members, some of them veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq, is said to have several thousand sympathisers. Unlike the first generation, it is not interested in tacit agreements.

"After the occupation of Iraq many terrorists returned from Iraq there they had trained in new and more violent techniques than before," says Brigadier General Yehya Abdullah Saleh, head of Yemen's Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU). "This is a very big challenge our security."

In combating al Qaeda, the US will have to consider elements within Saleh's power structure, which the president himself has put in place and now struggles to entangle himself from and make it difficult for him to serve a US agenda which is to destroy al Qaeda. "President Saleh needs to carry out political and economical reforms," says al-Iryani, "but he is not allowed to do so by his partners."

Approaching the tribes

The third pillar of power is constituted by the tribes who rule the vast areas outside Sana'a. Through his presidency Saleh has created a patronage society where tribes have been paid for their loyalty. He has kept their power in check by the principle of divide and rule forming strong ties to some and alienating others, a game which has not always been easy: He is said to have compared it to ‘dancing on heads of snakes.'

It is among the traditional tribes al Qaeda has sought refuge. Although it is thought that al Qaeda's ideology is too rigid to win over tribes many point to a worrying tendency in the network's relation with the tribes.

As opposed to al Qaeda in Iraq which was made up of mainly foreign fighters, the network in Yemen is mainly Yemenis and Saudis who understand the tribal traditions. They tread carefully compared to al Qaeda in Iraq whose actions lead to their alienation from the tribes, a serious set back for them.

Al Qaeda in Yemen has changed it's rhetoric to fit in with the tribe's discourse. Through their website 'Sada al-Malahim' the network has broadcast messages taking on the role as the mouthpiece of the tribes citing unfair distribution of oil revenues which is a major grievance of the tribes. There are also reports of al Qaeda operatives marrying into tribes.

"We are worried at the thought that al Qaeda will start to support these communities and at the same time through the back door smuggle in their ideology," says a western diplomat in Sana'a. Such a development would make it hard to strike at al Qaeda without drawing the anger of the tribes, which could create a greater conflict.

A skilful gambler

But many tribal leaders deny supporting al Qaeda. Cast in the role as scapegoat several sheikhs claim they know where al Qaeda is in their area, but that the authorities have not approached them to help uproot the militants.

"The president should call upon the local sheikhs in order to help fight al-Qaeda," says one sheikh, who does not want his name published. "But no one has approached us, why not?" he asks.

But many such questions remain unanswered in Yemen. The ability and willingness of the president to eradicate al Qaeda once and for all is complicated by his alliances with powerful Islamist groups who exercise their influence in society and the security services and who may well not support a fully fledged offensive against fellow pious Muslims, even if some see al Qaeda as misguided.

Equally, given Yemen's dire financial situation and the decades of neglect it has suffered from the international community, the generous assistance now being offered to the state in order to crack down on al Qaeda may not in fact create an incentive for the network's destruction. As many analysts in Sanaa put it: if you finish al Qaeda, the purse strings close.

Author: Annasofie Flamand
Editor: Rob Mudge