Overture to the fall of the Wall

October 29, 1989. It's Sunday. Walter Momper, governing mayor of West Berlin, is in the eastern part of the city. Not entirely incognito, but not officially, either: Manfred Stolpe, a leading figure of East Germany's Protestant Church, has invited him for lunch, surprise guests included.

Stolpe, a Social Democrat who became state premier in Brandenburg after reunification, is just acting as go-between. He has two top-level GDR representatives in tow: Günter Schabowski, East Berlin SED (Socialist Unity Party) leader and Erhard Krack, mayor of the East German (GDR) capital.

Serving as venue for this conspiratorial East-West-exchange is the Rose Parlor of the Palace Hotel. Among other things, the two East Germans want to discuss the GDR's new travel law about which, four days earlier, the SED party newspaper Neues Deutschland had written for all to read: Further details to follow. The law was scheduled to come into force before Christmas. This was a sensation - a feeling shared by Momper.

Basic work in East Berlin

Momper is downright electrified, according to contemporary historian Hans-Hermann Hertle. As early as the following day he set up a task force under the leadership of the senator for economic affairs.

Schabowski's account surpasses his expectations. Within just a few weeks, hundreds of thousands of East Germans will be allowed to visit West Berlin. The GDR intends to issue passports in order to contain a mass escape movement. Momper knows that his city is not prepared for this kind of rush.

Additional border checkpoints will have to be set up. To Momper's surprise, Schabowski shares this view. Accommodation for East Germans is an open question as well: No-one knows how many of them will just visit and how many will stay. And there are further issues: Will they arrive in their Trabi and Wartburg cars? And they'll definitely be needing maps of West Berlin.

Time is of the essence. Schabowski gives Momper a date: From December 1 at the earliest, the people of West Berlin will have to expect considerable numbers of visitors from the East. Trying to respond adequately, the task force decides in its first meeting on November 1 to schedule follow-up sessions for November 8 and November 15 respectively - unaware that just a short time later events will spiral out of East Germany's control.

Disgruntled Allies

November 3: The Rose Parlor meeting does not remain secret for long. Western Allies are miffed: They take a dim view of unauthorized talks with East Berlin behind their backs. American envoy Harry Gilmore urges Momper to report to the three Western Allies.

For Egon Bahr, former SPD party leader and Chancellor Willy Brandt's most important foreign policy adviser, it's a mystery to this day that Momper could establish contact with East Berlin at all, without the Americans, the British and the French knowing about it and giving their blessings.

He told DW that he harbors great doubts with respect to the nature and development of the Momper-Schabowski talks. The lack of consultation with the Allies, in particular, to him is incomprehensible.

Even Horst Teltschik, Helmut Kohl's most important adviser in the chancellor's office, claims ignorance as to the Momper-Schabowski talks. "I don't remember any concrete decisions or considerations regarding the opening of the border prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall," he told DW. Conclusion: West Berlin was out on its own at the time.

A controversial letter

On November 6, Walter Momper writes a letter to Chancellor Helmut Kohl. West Berlin, being financially dependent on Bonn, will be unable to cope with the challenge without help from the German Federal Government.

Among other things, Momper proposes that the government send its "welcoming money" to the GDR's state bank, which could then proceed to hand it over to those intending to visit West Germany. Kohl would never have accepted this, says historian Hans-Hermann Hertle, because such a step would have provided legitimization to the GDR leadership.

It is evident that Momper wants to set up a meeting with Kohl. But his letter remains unanswered, Momper tells Hertle many years later. The three-page document was intercepted by the GDR's Stasi secret police. Although the GDR was imploding as a state, its spy network was still functioning perfectly.

Party leader out of his depth

Come November, Berlin is getting ready for the rush and appears to be on the safe side even without support from Bonn. After all, the accords agreed on October 29 had included Schabowski's assurance to send out an early warning two weeks prior to the announced opening of the border.

The central idea of the new GDR travel regulations is handing out passports, issued on request. Dealing with these requests would take a processing period of about six weeks. It was a plan with built-in checks, spread out over weeks. However, events took an unexpected turn. The early warning call never came.

Bureaucracy, for all intents and purposes an area of competence of the SED dictatorship, turns out to be a maze in which the protagonists lose their bearings. Marathon sessions and lack of sleep having taken their toll, and Schabowski fails to stay on top of things in a crucial press conference on November 9.

There is a blocking period for the travel law, but Schabowski is unaware of this. The original plan was to broadcast the new travel regulations on the radio at 4 a.m. the following morning so that border guards would be informed and prepared. Organized exits would have been possible. But briefly before 7 p.m. Schabowski utters the key phrase: "…according to my knowledge this is right now, immediately."

Years later, Schabowski revealed all the other thoughts that crossed his mind during that historic press conference. Responding to a journalist's question whether the new travel regulation applied to West Berlin as well, "it suddenly hit me that we had not discussed this with the Soviets." It is amazing to see how independently the Germans arranged their destiny in the early autumn of 1989.