German Election: A Chance for Transatlantic Ties?

Jackson Janes is the executive director of the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He has lectured extensively on topics dealing with Germany.

DW-WORLD: Last weekend, President George W. Bush said that military options vis-a-vis Iran should not be ruled out. In his opening election campaign appearance, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder responded to Bush by saying that military operations shouldn't be options, pointing out that "we have already seen that they don't amount to anything." What do you think of the diverging opinions?

Jackson Janes: That is a formula for real friction in the next few months. When we talk about this problem, we can't say: What are the implications for German or European-US relations without talking about Iran itself and its ability to come up with a proposal. This is a situation that is different than Iraq. We actually know that there are materials available to build nuclear weapons should Iran pursue that further than they are now. The issue to me is what needs to be said to Tehran that makes it clear that the EU-3 and the US are on the same page. Therefore, I don't think Chancellor Schröder's comments were helpful because the powers in Tehran will have the impression that the West is not unified in the matter.

Do you think that it was just campaigning on Schröder's part?

It could be. A lot of Germans are concerned about the situation in Iraq, let alone about another fire that could start in that region. There's clearly a lot of people worried.

The conservative Christian Democrats and chancellor candidate Angela Merkel are still ahead in the polls heading towards the Sept. 18 poll. What benefits could come if the CDU and Merkel were to win the elections?

I think it depends on the coalition that is formed, whether it be with the Free Democrats or possibly a grand coalition. The result is still not yet evident so I can't say what kind of a position she would have. What I can say is that as a person, she would try to find the common denominators with the US that she could lay out immediately. For example, in the Balkans, Afghanistan, China or Russia. Then she could say, "Let's see how we can deal with these areas."

And Turkey's entrance into the European Union?

That's one area where there will be differences. But I don't think that a Merkel administration will try to stop the start of negotiations with Turkey over Ankara's entrance into the EU. Many people in her party think that talks result de facto in membership. I don't think that is the case. I think negotiations will begin in October but the potential entrance of Turkey into the EU will be a long evolutionary process that could take at least 10 years. As for the US, we have to remember that although Washington does favor Turkish membership, they don't have a seat in the EU. The US does, however, want to see an EU that is expansive, not expanding, to those regions that need help, such as Ukraine and what is probably up next, the Balkans.

The war on terror, specifically the Iraq war, has driven a wedge between Germany and the US. Germans have seen what has happened to American allies, i.e. the Madrid and London bombings, and support Schröder 100 percent on his position not to go to war. Do you think that the US will try to court Germany more for support?

Let's put it this way. I think that it would be a dangerous illusion for the Germans to think that because they did not participate in the Iraq war, that they have some kind of Maginot Line that protects them from terrorist attacks. That said, I have heard that there is a lot of collaboration and cooperation going on between Germany and the United States. When it comes to the fight against terrorism, there is probably a lot more happening than meets the public's eye. What seems useful to me is to think in terms of what the capabilities are that Germany has in order to root out what we know is a problem within Europe and see it as a common threat.

The two sides may be cooperating but then there is the example of the Motassadeq trial in Hamburg. That would have been a great opportunity for the US to hand over the information obtained from terrorism suspects they were holding so that German prosecutors could have a more solid case?

I agree that would have been a great chance. I unfortunately am not privy to the reasons why the US is holding back information. This is exactly the kind of situation where security agencies need to have more transparency, and that distrust or mistrust is inappropriate when dealing with such situations if it is going to lead to the conviction of a terrorist suspect. The whole trial seems to cry out for a more effective way of sharing information. In Europe that has been a problem, but the US, in light of 9/11 and with the various intelligence and security agencies, naturally has this problem too.

Both Gerhard Schröder and Angela Merkel would like Germany to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. What must Germany do after the elections to win US support for this?

Germany has put the cart in front of the horse on this issue. There's no question on both sides of the Atlantic that the UN Security Council needs to be reformed and that it needs to look like the 21st century and not 1945. But the whole UN needs drastic reforms, so it would be wiser to tackle the question of Security Council reform within the framework of general UN reform.

What do you think US reactions would be if Gerhard Schröder, a master of the comeback as evidenced in 2002, and the SPD did manage to win the Sept. 18 election?

If Gerhard Schröder is re-elected a second time, then the questions here will be: What can we do? What can we expect? Where are the policy parameters? And then lay it out to Berlin and ask if they can deliver.