Ex-US ambassador: Kobani will not fall

James F. Jeffrey was US ambassador in Turkey from 2008 to 2010 and to Iraq from 2010 to 2012. He was Deputy National Security Advisor to George W. Bush from 2007 to 2008. Jeffrey is currently a distinguished visiting fellow at The Washington Institute.

What do you make of the US decision to arm the Kurds in Syria in defiance of Turkey's wishes not to do so?

James F. Jeffrey: I just looked at the timeline of statements and calls on October 18 and 19. The Turks and specifically President Erdogan were taking a hard line equating the PYD (Kurdish Democratic Union Party - the ed.) to the PKK and essentially to "Islamic State" (IS), but at that time the United States was under pressure from the Kurds and from the military situation to do more. So Obama called Erdogan and Secretary of State Kerry called his counterpart too. And the result was essentially a Turkish change of heart. It's not clear and I can't confirm that the Turks gave the green light. But clearly after the conversation the US went ahead with the drops. Whether the talks were informing the Turks, coordinating with them or seeking their agreement is somewhat unclear - and it's always unclear with the Turks.

However, this was a sovereign decision by the United States. We did not overfly Turkish territory. But then Turkey did not make much noise about that. And if you saw in the last few days how much noise it made over the Biden statement (Biden alleged recently that Erdogan had admitted to allowing foreign fighters to cross into Syria which Erdogan denied - the ed.) and various other things, you know how much noise Turkey can make when it wants to. So not only did it not make much noise about it - while not saying it formally approved it - it authorized the peshmerga from Northern Iraq to enter through a corridor through Turkey.

What Erdogan is trying to do is essentially to placate the US, which is an important ally, the international community which gave Turkey a stinging slap in the face on the UN Security Council vote just last week, and frankly to save the remnants of his outreach to his own Kurds and the PKK and their political party inside Turkey by moving forward without giving his political opponents the ammunition that he is somehow arming or allowing the arming of the PKK counterpart, the Syrian PYD. So now we have 'good Kurds' fighting in Kobani, not just 'bad Kurds.' This is all theater, but the combination of Erdogan's personality, electoral politics and the extremely complicated situation from Turkey's standpoint where all these actors - IS, Assad, the PKK/PYD are all bad or potentially bad actors.

So Turkey's motivation was to placate the international community and not a heartfelt change of policy?

It was to placate the international community. But it is a change in Erdogan's position - and it is an important switch. It shows the flexibility and response to the international community we have not seen with this guy in a long, long time. And he saves various things by doing it, so it shows a bit of rationality on his part. It is not a basic shift. He is going to maintain this - I know him - for domestic political reasons and because he doesn't change his mind easily. But it is a shift of some significance.

But remember there is an American shift too. A week ago Friday and then again on Sunday, John Kerry was saying that Kobani was not a strategic objective of the United States. Essentially, we now finally found a place where people were willing to stand up and fight against IS. And so we decided to support them. And once the United States really decides it wants to do something people tend to go along. And that's what's called leadership. We showed leadership in Kobani. It is a rare thing these days coming out of Washington, but that is the strategic lesson out of this: If you show leadership, people follow you.

What does this Turkish and American role reversal mean for Kobani then?

What this means is that Kobani is not going to fall. Now we can't let it fall and it doesn't look like it is falling.

What does this mean for American-Turkish relations?

Remember what the US said, that this was not a strategic shift vis-à-vis the Kurds in general, the PYD/PKK in particular, but that this was a tactical decision. And that we will hold to this tactical position, just like Erdogan will hold to the fact that he did not authorize the American air drop and that the PYD is still like the PKK and no better than IS. He won't change his opinion. The main point is: On the ground dramatic facts have changed. Peshmerga will flow in, arms will flow in and IS will be defeated.

There are reports that IS is also trying to bring in new fighters to take Kobani, because they also consider this a symbolic battle. But you still think the US and Turkey and the other alliance partners will defeat IS in Kobani?

With enough ammunition and some good relief troops from the peshmerga and coordination with US air power - you can write this - they can send 20,000 IS fighters and it would make our day. We would kill them all. This is exactly what you dream of in a quasi counterinsurgency with a quasi guerilla army.